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Introduction: $P\$OOHQ¶V$QJHOXV1RYXV  
Albena Azmanova 
Amy Allen is cautious of progress. And she is fighting for it. The ammunition, elaborated in 
her audacious The End of Progress, is a form of critique that emanates from a synergy she 
builds between the discontents of post-colonial theory and the insights of critical theory. The 
GHEDWHVWKDWIROORZHGWKHERRN¶VSXEOLFDWLRQRIWHQSUHVHQWHG$OOHQ¶VHQOLJKWHQHGVFHSWLFLVP
as scepticism of the Enlightenment; her rejection of the hubris of a Eurocentric historical 
logic of progress -- as a wholesale rejection of the universalism implied in the commitment to 
emancipation. The commentaries collected in this exchange (which began at a meeting in 
Prague in May 2017) rebalance the pendulum of criticism ± ZKLOHPRVWRI$OOHQ¶VFULWLFV
have found her unpalatably critical of progress, these five interventions urge her to be more 
boldly so. Guilel Treiber counsels her to pay due attention to the insignificant and the 
infamous, Andrew Feenberg -- to acknowledge the way technical artefacts and systems are 
appropriated or suffered by ordinary people, Noëlle McAfee ± to have stronger trust in the 
moral intuitions of lived experience, Azar Dakwar and Martin Saar -- to have the courage to 
think emancipation without the crutches of a notion of progress. 
Earlier versions of the analyses collected here had a common denominator ± they all 
lauded WKHDXWKRU¶VSDVVLRQDWHFRPPLWPHQWWRHPDQFLSDWRU\FULWLTXHDQGexpressed a 
recognition of the bRRN¶Vmagisterial status, powerfully established in the receptions it 
received in the last two years ± a work that broke new ground, inspired discussions, stirred 
controversies and opened up trajectories for new work and further questions, to use Martin 
6DDU¶VIRUPXODWLRQof a stance all contributions articulated in various way. Yet, when 
preparing the papers for publication, I took the liberty to eliminate the acclaim ± not only for 
the sake of parsimony, but also because there is no need to praise this fine book of Amy 
$OOHQ¶VDQ\PRUH 
As an organiser of this exchange, and a silent spectator to many others, I prefer not to 
take a stance either RQ$P\$OOHQ¶VYLHZVRQSURJUHVVor on the way she derives them. 
Instead, I will express a hope: that future engagements with this book will elaborate further 
and put to work the formula of emancipatory critique Allen has articulated: her idea of 
metanormativ contextualism - a contextualist but nonrelativistic account of the moral-political 
imperative of emancipation, empowered by the method of genealogical problematisation of 




Novus ± his face turned towards the past, seeing not progress but suffering, cognisant of 
5HDVRQ¶VIDOOLELOLW\DYHUVHWRDPELWLRQVIRUDSHUIHFWKLVWRU\\HWUHOHQWOHVVO\GULYHQE\a  
single and singular calling ± the fight against injustice. With an accomplishment of such 
magnitude, figuring out exactly how sceptical Allen is of progress might be beside the point. 
 
Saving History from Progress 
Martin Saar  
 
Amy $OOHQ¶VSURSRVDOLVWRUHWKLQNDQGUHYLVHWKH³QRUPDWLYHIRXQGDWLRQV´RI&ULWLFDOTheory 
by problematizing the use that is made of conceptions of progress in various forms. She finds 
these uses problematic, even pernicious and dangerous, given the many convincing 
arguments against the parochial, paternalistic, ethnocentric nature of the visions of progress 
that have been and still are in circulation in modern Western thought. Revising these 
supposed foundations is therefore needed, but, Allen implies, progress can be recovered as a 
basis, as a different, recovered foundation. Critical Theory can remain founded on progress, if 
understood differently. 
0\SRLQWRIGHSDUWXUHLVDQXQHDVLQHVVZLWK$OOHQ¶VILUVWVWHSWRDFKLHYHWKLVJRDOKHU
elegant but seductive distinction between two kinds of (concepts of) progress. One is taken to 
be backward-ORRNLQJSURJUHVVDVD³IDFW´WKHRWKHUIRUZDUG-looking (progress as 
RULHQWDWLRQRU³LPSHUDWLYH´WKHILUVWLVFULWLFL]HGDVLGHDOLVWDQGREMHFWLYLVWWKHVHFRQG
praised as ethically motivated and action-oriented. From the first perspective³SURJUHss is a 
MXGJPHQWDERXWWKHGHYHORSPHQWDORUOHDUQLQJSURFHVVWKDWKDVOHGXSWRµXV¶DMXGJPHQWWKDW
YLHZVµRXU¶FRQFHSWLRQRIUHDVRQµRXU¶PRUDO-SROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQVµRXU¶VRFLDOSUDFWLFHV
µRXU¶IRUPRIOLIHDVWKHUHVXOWRIDSURFHVVRIVRFLRFXOWXUal development or historical 
OHDUQLQJ´)URPWKHVHFRQGSHUVSHFWLYH³SURJUHVVLVDPRUDO-political imperative, a normative 
goal that we are striving to achieve, a goal that can be captured under the idea of the good or 
DWOHDVWRIWKHPRUHMXVWVRFLHW\´11-12). While this is definitely a distinction that can be 
made and that can be reconstructed from several texts in the Critical Theory tradition, it 
might be harder to defend systematically than it seems. One might suspect (and I do) that the 
idealist heritage remains operative (even if implicitly) even in the very attempt to overcome 
the objectivist side of the concept of progress and that this attempt, too, remains tied to a 
framework that ultimately, I fear, cannot enable us to think real historical contingency today. 
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Let me just remind you of the conceptual function the notion of progress had in the 
HPHUJLQJSKLORVRSKLHVRIKLVWRU\IURPWKHHDUO\(QOLJKWHQPHQWWR+HJHO³SURJUHVV´WKHYHU\
idea, was meant to weave together into a single narrative the past, present and future by 
suggesting their continuity or teleological structure. Looking back on past achievements 
within the framework of a fully-developed philosophy of history in this framework just is the 
very basis for a projection into the future; looking back is the attempt for finding 
confirmation of the path chosen and an inspiration for staying on it. There would be much to 
say about the theological roots of this idea and their persistence even in secularized ideas of 
historical teleology (an issue J. Taubes, H. Blumenberg, K. Löwith and others were 
struggling with for decades, cf. Lara 2013). Moreover, there would be a need for 
GLIIHUHQWLDWLRQEHWZHHQZHDNHUFRQFHSWVRIKLVWRULFDOSURJUHVVOLNH.DQW¶VDQG'LGHURW¶V
and their strongest, idealist version (in Hegel). But the categorical heritage as such seems 
rather hard to break: Conceptually speaking, talking progress means talking continuity, and 
this implies linking past, present and futurity in a substantial, continuous way. In other words, 
claiming that the notion of progress can be broken down into two different things that can be 
KHOGDSDUWDV$OOHQGRHVHLWKHU³IDFW´RU³LPSHUDWLYH´VWLOOFRPPLWVWRDWKHVLVDERXWWKLV
continuity, this essential link between the three different registers of temporality. Establishing 
this link is what a philosophy of history in the strong sense does, i.e. what a philosophy with 
a place for the notion of progress implicates. 
In the current discussion there is a version of an argument Allen also might subscribe 
to (this is not obvious) that goes like this: any emancipatory intention or any form of 
progressive collective action needs to presuppose an idea of progress, the real possibility of 
things getting better. For many, this seems to be a knock-down, quasi-transcendental 
argument (that might be worthy of the late Karl-Otto Apel)EXW,GRQ¶WVHHWKDWLWLVDVVWURQJ
as many authors claim (see the recent work of Thomas McCarthy on development, Axel 
Honneth on the inevitable progress in Kant, or Rahel Jaeggi on progress and regression). 
Trying not to commit past errors again, taking up historical responsibility or learning from 
the past does not ± in my view ± DPRXQWWRDFDVHIRU³SURJUHVV´LQWKHSKLORVRSK\-of-
history-sense, just for learning, for orientation, for politics. But I see that many authors in the 
current discussion seem to think so and this might tell us something about Critical Theory in 
FULWLFDOWLPHVDWOHDVWWKDWLWEHFRPHVKDUGHUQRWWRORVHRQH¶VQHUYHV5HVWRULQJWKH
philosophy of histories is certainly one way of responding to this situation. It might not come 
without cost, though. 
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Why is this ± subscribing to progress or overcoming it ± a problem in and for Critical 
Theory? Well, just because the case against progress as a concept as such seems to be an 
argument advanced by several prominent points of reference and interlocutors within Critical 
Theory, namely by Benjamin and Foucault in their attacks on the idealist and progressivist 
conceptions of history. Both of them seemed to worry that thinking history under the sign of 
progress (i.e. idealistically) amounts to a systematic denial of history or historicity as such. 
7KLVRSSRVLWLRQSURJUHVVYVKLVWRU\PLJKWQRWEHHDVLO\PDSSHGRQWR$OOHQ¶VVHFRQGSDLURI
concepts, ³KLVWRULFDOSURJUHVV´YV³SURJUHVVLQKLVWRU\´LQGHHGERWKRIWKHODWWHUPLJKW
appear to be bound up with rest-idealist assumptions if one accepts the post-foundationalist, 
post-idealist critiques. 
In his fragments on the concept of history, Benjamin (2003: 393) attacked what he 
FDOOVWKH³FRQIRUPLVP´RI6RFLDO'HPRFUDWLFDQG0DU[LVWSROLWLFDOWKHRUL]LQJ7KH idea that 
the working class might benefit from the gradual advancement of science, technological and 
VRFLDOUHIRUPKDVSURYHQIDWHIXO³1RWKLQJKDVVRFRUUXSWHGWKH*HUPDQZRUNLQJFODVVDVWKH
notion that it was moving with the current. It regarded technological development as the 
driving force of the stream with which it thought it was moving´Benjamin 2003: 393). 
Accordingly, a politics accommodated to bourgeois society was determined by a dogmatic 
FRQFHSWRI³SURJUHVVRIKXPDQNLQGLWVHOIDQGQRWMXVWDGYDQFHVLQKXPDQDELOLW\DQG
NQRZOHGJH´HQYLVLRQHGDV³VRPHWKLQJERXQGOHVVLQNHHSLQJZLWKDQLQILQLWHSHUIHFtibility 
RIKXPDQLW\´DQG³LQHYLWDEOH±something that automatically pursued a straight or spiral 
course´Benjamin 2003: 394). &DOOLQJIRUD³FULWLFLVPRIWKHFRQFHSWRISURJUHVVLWVHOI´
Benjamin (2003: 395) was calling attention to the ideological function this notion has played 
by suggesting an inherent connection between certain historical events and the eventual 
liberation from social demise the working classes have suffered from. It is in this sense that 
progress as such, the very notion or idea, in BHQMDPLQ¶VH\HVSOD\VWKHUROHRIDOHJLWLPDWLQJ
narrative or apologetic ideology, obstructing any real or disenchanted class struggle. 
)RXFDXOW¶VDWWDFNRQFRQYHQWLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYHVLQWKHKLVWRU\RILGHDVRULQ
historiography in general might be said to have advanced in a similar way. Traditional 
historiography proceeds by creating unities and entities whose coherence and continuity they 
can only presuppose. But for Foucault, it is only their disruption and disassembling that will 
make visible the agonistic, dynamic character of identities and historical subjects or objects 
of knowledge. Philosophies of history, however, will conceal or even deny this ever shifting, 






history remains in contemporary Frankfurt School FULWLFDOWKHRU\´VKHPHDQVWKDWWKHUHLVDQ
XQTXHVWLRQHGUHOLDQFHRQ³DFHUWDLQGHYHORSPHQWDOXQLGLUHFWLRQDODQGFXPXODWLYHPRUDO-
SROLWLFDOOHDUQLQJSURFHVV´9). However, we might suspect, even her own approach remains 
in the register of a philosophy of history. If her progress as imperative is to be progress in a 
meaningful sense, it, too, thinks the future philosophically in dependence from a common 
historicity with a meaning, a direction, a morality. 
Against such perspectives, Benjamin and Foucault ± rather differently, of course ± and 
many others were posing the thinking of history proper, the autonomy of historicity, when we 
mean by this the radically non-Hegelian view that there is no overarching frame (not Geist, 
not morality, but also not the sheer will to give political meaning to history). In this 
perspective, overcoming history-as-progress, un-thinking progress first of all means opening 
up the space for truly thinking historically. At least, this is one possible way of reading 
%HQMDPLQ¶VDQG)RXFDXOW¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVWR&ULWLFDO7KHRU\DQGLWPLJKWUXQFRXQWHUWRVRPH
FODLPVRI$OOHQ¶VFRQFHUQLQJWKHLQHYLWDELOLW\RIVRPHQRWLRQRISURJUHVVIRUDQ\WKHRU\
interested in contributing to political and social struggles. Outlining this possibility might 
therefore allow for reflecting on a different, maybe complementary story of how Critical 
Theory and critical theories today might relate to the problem of progress. 
7KHUHIRUH,DJUHHLWPLJKWKHOSWRWUXO\³move beyond progressive, developmentalist 
FRQFHSWLRQVRIKLVWRU\´%XWWKLVPLJKWPHDQLQGHHGWRUHQRXQFHWKHYHU\LGHDRI
progress as a historical category, as something within history that could be known, 
presupposed or guaranteed. This project might sound (and be) less dialectical in 
argumentative structure, maybe more destructive than the idea that a better concept of 
progress can be achieved via an immanent critique of Left-Hegelian philosophies of history 
RUWKDWWKHLGHDWKDWSURJUHVVPLJKWEHVRPHWKLQJ³ZHFDQQRWQRWZDQW´6SLYDNHowever, I 
think, the concept of progress is something we do not want, do not need, but only the idea 
and the practice of politics, or collective action, or emancipation. But these points of 
reference do not have to be not historically grounded, do not have to be normative 
foundations, they can be thought without banisters. Freeing history from the burden of 
progress, means freeing the present for politics, unfounded, ungrounded, contingent. 
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It is true: A politics grounded on a strong vision of one world history, its centers and 
immanent directions, derived from ideological and philosophical discourses and clad into 
armor has led into impasses and abysses from whose consequences the world still has not 
recovered. This much is true about the postcolonial attack on the complicity between 
progressivist and developmentalist thinking and colonial politics and domination. Critical 
7KHRU\DV$OOHQ¶VERRNKDVFRPSHOOLQJO\VKRZQVKRXOGKDYHDQGGRHVKave the 
responsibility and the means to respond to and do justice to this argument, and to join the 
theoretical and practical struggles for a truly common world. Defending or claiming the idea 
of progress, I contend, is no necessary part of this struggle. 
 
 
The Violence of Dust 
Guilel Treiber 
 
The fifth chapter of The End of Progress³)URPThe Dialectics of Enlightenment to The 
History of Madness´LVDFUXFLDOFKDSWHULQ$OOHQ¶VRYHUDOODUJXPHQWIRUGHFRORQL]LQJWKH
normative foundations of Critical Theory. In this part of the book, she builds on the preceding 
critical chapters a Foucauldian-Adornian alternative framework for thinking through the 
relationship between normativity and history (165). To think this relationship differently is to 
understand that the self-evident moral assumptions to which we are committed and which 
give meaning to our lives as moral agents must go together, in order for them to be truly 
PRUDOZLWKDQDZDUHQHVVRIWKHLUFRQWLQJHQWKLVWRULFDOQDWXUH³DIXQGDPHQWDOKXPLOLW\´) and 
a critical attitude that is always ready to put them into question (202). Allen offers a 
refreshing, highly original, and erudite reading of both The Dialectics of Enlightenment and 
The History of Madness. Her reading respects the individual character of the two works, 
while highlighting certain similarities between them, which allows her to formulate a 
Foucauldian-Adornian alternative approach to the concept of progress. She rejects the 
common reading of these two masterpieces that sees them as offering a regressive history of 
:HVWHUQ(QOLJKWHQPHQWDVDVWRU\RIGHFOLQH6KHLQVWHDGUHDGVWKHPDV³VHUYLQJDEURDGHU
SURMHFWRILPPDQHQWFULWLTXH´DLPHGDWDIXOOHUUHDOL]DWLRQRIWKHKHULWDJHRIWKH
(QOLJKWHQPHQWPRUHVSHFLILFDOO\WKHYDOXHVRI³freedom, inclusion, and respect for the 
RWKHU´+HQFH$OOHQGRHVQRWUHDG$GRUQRRU)RXFDXOWDVODPHQWLQJWKHHQGRI
Enlightenment or as trying to break completely with its heritage, but as two thinkers who 
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enable her to propose a forward-looking concept of progress, emphasizing the open character 
of a future humanity to come (174). 
,WLVWHPSWLQJWRVXEVFULEHIXOO\DQGZLWKRXWKHVLWDWLRQVWR$OOHQ¶VYHUVLRQRISURJUHVV
and its ability to sustain a normative position that respects the other without ever succumbing 
to relativism. However, I would like to raise a few critical points, all concerned with the 
LPSRUWDQFH$OOHQDWWDFKHVWR)RXFDXOW¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHKLVWRULFDODSULRULDQGWKHUHODWLRQLW
entails between philosophy and history. Allen does not aim at an exegetical reading of 
)RXFDXOW¶VILUVWLPSRUWDQWERRN+HQFHHYHQWKRXJK she has criticized Lynne Huffer for not 
being Foucauldian enough in her reading of The History of Madness, I do not aim to direct 
that same critique to Allen herself (Allen 2013: 21). My worry is that the use Allen makes of 
Foucault may bring Foucault too close to Adorno and reduce the practical value activists have 
attached WRWKHIRUPHU¶VZRUNLQWKHODVWIHZGHFDGHV(Halperin 1997; Huffer 2010), rendering 
LWQRWKLQJEXW³DQDYRLGDQFHRIFDWDVWURSKH´ 175). The rapprochement Allen sets up 
between the two thinkers is possible through a specific understandLQJRI)RXFDXOW¶VXVHRI
history and his relative status as a philosopher or as a historian. In other words, Allen reads 
)RXFDXOW¶VKLVWRULFDOPHWKRGRORJ\ZLWKLQDVSHFLILFDOO\SKLORVRSKLFDOWUDGLWLRQWRVXFKDQ
extent that it glosses over the fact that Foucault can be both more useful for her argument and 
more problematic. She reduces the potential of using Foucault politically for the sake of a 
specific reading that tries to place him within the tension between praxis and theory, which is 
emblematic of the Frankfurt School tradition but stands at odds with the militant activism of 
French intellectuals throughout the 20th century. 
)RU$OOHQ³WKHDLPRI)RXFDXOW¶VSKLORVRSKLFDO-historical method is neither to 
YLQGLFDWHQRUWRVXEYHUW´FRQWHPSRUDU\ZD\VRIOLIHEXWWRRSHQXS³OLQHVRIIUDJLOLW\DQG
fraFWXUH´ZLWKLQWKDWIRUPRIOLIH (177, 182). The light we shed, through the work of critique, 
on the fractures in our historical a priori will enable us to turn fixed, stratified relations of 
domination into flexible, reversible power relations and to open ourselves up to new selves 
and new collective forms of social imagination (Allen 2015a, 525). However, Allen 
repeatedly attaches this process to thought itself, to the emancipatory potential of philosophy, 
and never to actual, lived experience, to practices or institutions, as Foucault repeatedly tried 
to do throughout his work. In an often-quoted interview, Foucault distinguishes between his 
ZRUNDQGWKDWRIWKH)UDQNIXUW6FKRROE\UHIHUULQJWR0DU[¶VLGHDWKDWPDQSURGXFHVPDQ+H
emphasizes that representatives of the Frankfurt School understand the result of this 
production as already given, for example, by positing the desired result (freedom, inclusion, 
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and respect for other) at the end of a process of emancipation. For him the production of man 
E\PDQFDQFRPHRQO\DV³DGHVWUXFWLRQRIZKDWZHDUHDVZHOODVWKHFUHDWLRQRID
FRPSOHWHO\GLIIHUHQWWKLQJDWRWDOLQQRYDWLRQ´(Foucault 1997a, 275) The destruction of what 
we are must be understood as potentially violent, not just in thought but in its concrete 
political manifestations. 
For Allen, The History of Madness FDQEHUHDGDVD³GLVWLQFWO\+HJHOLDQDWWHPSWWRWDNH
up and radically transform Hegelian philosophy from within´+LVWRU\ZLWKDFDSLWDO+
is so crucial to our modern a priori that we can call it the ³+LVWRULFDOKLVWRULFDODSULRUL´Ibid: 
)RXFDXOW¶VHistory of Madness, read as a genealogy of History aims at opening up an 
internal fracture within the historical a priori of our Western societies, enabling us to think 
beyond the Hegelian dialectic of historical progress to which, according to Allen, Habermas 
and Honneth are still committed. If The History of Madness opens up the fracture, the figure 
RIXQUHDVRQXVHGE\)RXFDXOWWKURXJKRXWWKHERRNLVZKDWLOOXPLQDWHVWKH³OLQHVRIIUDJLOLW\´
that can open into real fractures (177-178). For Allen, the process of illumination seems to be 
a condition of any politico-epistemological change in the possibilities of social and individual 
LPDJLQDWLRQV 7KH SURFHVV RI LOOXPLQDWLRQ FDQ KDSSHQ RQO\ WKURXJK PHWLFXORXV ³JHQWOH
GLJJLQJ´KRZHYHULQWKH HQGWKHUHPXVWEHDPRPHQWZKHUH³KDPPHUEORZV´DUHQHFHVVDU\
(182). If that is the case, then we must ask how one opens the fractures into a space of freedom. 
Although these hammer blows may be thought of as theoretical violence done to thought itself 
(173), there is no reason to assume their theoretical character. Hence, if one wants to break the 
cracks illuminated by the figure of unreason (and I think unreason could be replaced with the 
figure of the Orient or Queer), one must confront the question of violence ± of real, practical, 
explosive hammer blows ± done not only to the coherence of our historical a priori but to the 
coherence of our concrete social ways of being and even to our lives. Moreover, there is no 
reason to accept, as Allen seems to do, the necessary relation between theory and praxis or to 
understand theoretical efforts as conditions of praxis. On the contrary, in general after 1968 
similar positions were rejected by post-structuralist intellectuals and specifically by Foucault 
himself (Foucault 1997b, 452±53)7RXVH$OOHQ¶VPHWDSKRUDJDLQVWKHU WKHJHQWOHGLJJLQJ
usually comes after the hammer blows. If we understand hammer blows as practices of 
resistance, we may see in certain cases an interaction between them and the work of the critical 
theorist or the archeologist. However, this work is not their necessary conditions. History 
usually happens behind the back of its actors, and the best a critical theorist can do is often just 
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to suggest ways of interpreting the shifts we sense in our historical a priori without fully 
understanding from whence they came about. 
All this comes down to the way Allen understands what history is for Foucault. The 
ongoing debate between Foucauldians regarding whether Foucault is a historian or a 
philosopher has preoccupied Allen in the last two years since the publication of The End of 
Progress (Allen 2016c; Allen and Aldea 2016; Allen 2017). The issue is crucial to her 
argument in the book. Although Allen presents her position as a middle ground between the 
two interpretations, and rightly claims that history is crucial foU)RXFDXOW¶VPHWKRGRORJ\
she understands Foucault as engaging with a very philosophical history. Allen takes history to 
be, for Foucault, incomprehensible except in relation to the Hegelian History he rejects (177). 
Though Allen is partially right, KHUHPSKDVLVRQ)RXFDXOW¶VGLDORJXHZLWK+HJHOZKLFKVKHKDV
emphasized for some time (Allen 1998) KDVEURXJKWKHUWRUHGXFH)RXFDXOW¶VKLVWory to that of 
a philosopher. History for Foucault is that of historians, as he has repeatedly made clear 
(Foucault 2005: 171±73, 1980: 43±46), a history of the dust and silence of the archive and not 
the abstract archive, but the real, concrete one, of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France or the 
Bibilothèque du Saulchoir. It is between the crumbling pages of manuscripts in the many 
archives that Foucault visited, that he wrote all of his books. The archive constitutes, for 
Foucault, a sort of implicit ethical impetus, which Allen could have used in her argument as 
well. For the archive is not meant to be dug for no reason, but to capture the marginal voices 
that official History has failed to erase. For Foucault, the beauty of these lives, forever 
forgotten, of which we have nothing but the echoes of their momentary meetings with power 
structures, is what constitutes the intolerable against which he must react. 
,Q³7KH/LIHRI,QIDPRXV0HQ´DWH[WORQJQHJOHFWHGE\$PHULFDQUHDGHUVRI)RXFDXOW
he highlights a theme that many of his previous works (specifically The History of Madness 
and Discipline and Punish) brilliantly captured: the significance of insignificant lives (Foucault 
1979))RXFDXOW¶VKLVWRULFDOPHWKRGRORJ\LVQRWRQO\SUHRFFXSLHGZLWKUHSHDWLQJ1LHW]VFKH¶V
critique of Hegel as Allen suggests. It does something Nietzsche never intended to do with 
history, which is to give back a voice to those whom official history has forgotten. These lives 
of infamous men and women (and queers, perverts, libertines and freethinkers too) are to be 
understood much as history should, not in any abstract manner or as a philosophical concept, 
EXWLQWKHLU³FRQVWLWXWHGPDWHULDOLW\WKURXJKDPXOWLSOLFLW\RIGHVFULEDEOHSRVLWLYHGLPHQVLRQV´
(Lorenzini 2015: 41±42). Hence, for Foucault, archival work as concrete historical practice 
carries within it the fractures of our historical a priori, which is never actually as coherent as 
one would assume. The role of the genealogist is indeed to trace their fragile figure, and to 
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summon them back into the present, although this work can never be in itself enough to open 
a space of freedom. Opening spaces for freedom is only possible by and through the actions of 
real living people in the radicality of their transgressive destruction and re-construction, in the 
violence of political oppositions and in the existential risk of their lives, subjectivities, and 
bodies, which are all missing in The End of Progress. 
 
 




There is little doubt that Allen's The End of Progress is extraordinarily timely, daring and 
incisive, for it leaps into a paramount zone of vulnerability at the core of Critical Theory: the 
role and function of progress in critical historical and normative consciousness. My point of 
departure in this commentary is one of principled agreement with Allen ± that is, both with her 
pointed critique of the justifications for historical progress in the works of a quintessential 
cohort of critical theorists and with her observations about the pressing need to decolonize 
&ULWLFDO7KHRU\¶s normative foundations. Yet, it is my intention to interrogate the plausibility 
RI$OOHQ¶VVXJJHVWLYHIUDPHZRUNIRU³WKLQNLQJDERXWKLVWRU\DQGWKHTXHVWLRQRILWVQRUPDWLYH
JURXQGLQJ´  7R WKLV HQG , UHYLVLW $OOHQ¶V UHDGLQJ RI WKH )RXFDXOW-Derrida debate that 
IROORZHGWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI)RXFDXOW¶VHistory of Madness DVZHOODV)RXFDXOW¶V¶VEUDQG
RI FULWLFDO KLVWRULFLW\ IRU H[SOLFDWLQJ 'HUULGD¶V FULWLFLVP LQ D OLJKW FRQWUDU\ WR $OOHQ¶V YLHZ
WKHUHRI 6XEVHTXHQWO\ , VKDOO DUJXH WKDW 'HUULGD¶V FULWLTXH RI +HJHO¶V DQG )RXFDXOW¶V HDUO\
KLVWRULFLW\ZDVQRWGLVSODFHGRUWUDQVFHQGHGE\$OOHQ¶VFULWLFDOscheme. 
2QWKHRQHKDQGGHVSLWHKRZ)RXFDXOWVHYHUVWKH+HJHOLDQOHDSEHWZHHQWKH³3URFHVV
RI.QRZLQJ´DQGWKDWRI³$EVROXWH.QRZOHGJH´DQGKRZKHKLVWRUicizes this break), I concur 
ZLWK$OOHQWKDW)RXFDXOW¶VHDUO\FULWLFDOPHWKRGRORJ\RIKLVWRULFLW\FDQQRWEHXQGHUVWRRGEXW
in relation to Hegelian historical reason. On the other hand, and unlike Allen, I will contend 
that the critical historicism of the eDUO\)RXFDXOWFDQQRWVHWLWVHOIIUHHIURPWKHLQHUWLDRI+HJHO¶V
dialectical historicity, which endogenously conflates historicism as teleology with historicism 
as methodology )XQNHQVWHLQ0R\Q)ROORZLQJ'HUULGD¶VOLQHRIDUJXPHQWDWLRQ




critique) in the critical methodologies of the Frankfurt School and the early Foucault. This will 
HYHQWXDOO\OHDGXVWRTXHVWLRQ$OOHQ¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWCritical Theory can hold onto a specific 
FRQFHSWLRQRISURJUHVVDQGVWLOOEH³WUXO\FULWLFDO´$OOHQD 
7KHQRWLRQRISURJUHVVLV$OOHQ¶VPDLQREMHFWRILQTXLU\3URJUHVVKDV been a touchstone 
of the discursive formation of modernity writ-large and of Critical Theory¶VFRQFHSWLRQVRI
history and historicity, and of critique and normativity. While dispensing altogether with the 
claim to a backward-looking view of progress as historical IDFW $OOHQ¶V DFFRXQW HQGV XS
reaffirming the operative necessity of progress ± that is, of a moral-political progressivism 
devoid of commitment to any particular story of historical progress. Furthermore, Allen claims 
that progress in history ± which can be judged by normative standards that are themselves 
historically and contextually grounded ± is both possible and desirable for decolonizing (and 
³FULWLFDOL]LQJ´Critical Theory (33, 226). Allen then couches this nuanced position on progress 
within a specific conception of normativity ± namely metanormative contextualism ± that is 
³WKRURXJKO\ LPPDQHQW´   7DNHQ WRJHWKHU LI Critical Theory is to decolonize its 
epistemic premises and method, Allen prescribes placing a forward-looking conception of 
progress ± ³SURJUHVVDVLPSHUDWLYH´± at the center of &ULWLFDO7KHRU\¶V normative core. In short, 
moral-SROLWLFDOSURJUHVVUHPDLQVD³QHFHVVDU\ILFWLRQ´IRUDGHFRORQL]HGCritical Theory. 
Through this double move, Allen stretches thin (in the negative, Adornian sense) the 
normative foundations of Critical Theory. Still, she keeps them thin enough to look to the future 
DQGDVSLUH WR D IRUPRI ³GLUHFWLRQDOLW\´ WKDW WDNHV LWV FXHV IURPFHUWDLQZD\VRISHUFHLYLQJ
history. For if we were to remain true WR D PLQLPDO \HW ³QHFHVVDU\´ telos of the Frankfurt 
tradition, a theoretical apparatus with emancipatory intent must be maintained. Yet does the 
aspiration of emancipation from domination and suffering, whether of Frankfurter descent or 
otherwise, need to presuppose or pledge allegiance to any notion of progress? It is precisely 
this crucial entwinement of the imperatives of progress and emancipation in Critical Theory 
WKDW$OOHQ¶VERRNRYHUORRNV6WDWHGLQWKHIRUPRIDTXHVWLRQ&DQCritical Theory sustain a 
minimal emancipatory intent ± one divorced from a thick normative or utopian vision, as Allen 
perceptively requests (Allen 2015a) ± without a notion of progress prefiguring its working 
concepts of history, normativity and critique?  
TKHSURPLVHRIHPDQFLSDWLRQIURPWKHKLVWRULFDO³SULQFLSOHRIGRPLQDWLRQ´LQVRFLHW\
LVZKDW WKHRORJ\UHOLJLRQDQGDUWPDQDJHGWRXSKROGXQWLO WKHFRQVROLGDWLRQRIPRGHUQLW\¶V





in judgment over the entire sphere of experience. Reason¶VVHOI-grounding thus necessitates, 
even postulates in principle, an immanent critique of reason by reason. As a consequence, 
human emancipation from domination was exclusively delegated to immanent reason. 
7KHSUHYDOHQWQRWLRQRI+LVWRU\ZLWKFDSLWDOµ+¶± history as a totality) deployed in 
Critical Theory¶VGLVFRXUVHRQUHDVRQDQGPRGHUQLW\FDQEHDWWULEXWHG± in the paradigmatic 
sense ± WR+HJHO+HJHO¶VQRWLRQQDUUDWHVWKHSURFHVVLRQRIUHDVRQ¶VGLDOHFWLFDOVHOI-realization 
as it progresses toward possessing or stabilizing a state of knowledge ± ZKDWKHFDOOV³$EVROXWH
.QRZOHGJH´)RXFDXOW¶VFULWLFDOSURMHFWV± both early (History of Madness, Birth of the Clinic) 
and, to a lesser extent, early-middle (Order of Things, Archeology of Knowledge) ± can be read 
LQWKHVKDGRZDQGDVDUDGLFDOFULWLTXHRI+HJHO¶VSKLORVRSK\RIKLVWRU\$OOHQVXPPDUL]HVWKH
HDUO\ )RXFDXOW¶V VRSKLVWLFDWHG FULWLFDO SURMHFW DQG LWV UHOHYDQFH IRU SUHVHQW-day critique as 
follows:  
The most he would say is that there is historicity proper to our modern form of 
rationality ± a form which, following Hegel, takes reason to be Historical, and history 
to be rational ± and it is precisely the historicity of History that Foucault aims to reveal, 
as part of his critical effort to uncover the contingency of that form of knowledge, thus 
opening the possibility of moving beyond it. (Allen 2016c, p. 132) 
)RUDOO WKDW)RXFDXOW¶VKLVWRULFLW\RIKLVWRU\LVVXVWDLQHGWKURXJK WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶V subjective 
experience of non-subjective, discursively formed historical openings ± that is, of freedom 
(Oksala 2005). 6XFK D VWDQFH WKHUHIRUH FRXOG EH DW RGGV ZLWK WKH ³FROOHFWLYH SDUWDNLQJ´
prerequisite of Critical Theory¶VLPSHUDWLYHRIHPDQFLSDWLRQ 
7KLVDPELYDOHQWWHQVLRQEHWZHHQ)RXFDXOGLDQKLVWRULFLW\¶VFRQGLWLRQRISRVVLELOLW\DQG
Critical Theory¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRKXPDQHPDQFLSDWLRQSRVHVDQLQLWLDOFKDOOHQJHWR$OOHQZKR
seeks to secure for Critical Theory both normativity and critical immanence. Notwithstanding 
this problematic, Allen proceeds to ground her proposed method of immanent critique ± 
problematizing genealogy ± in the understanding of Foucauldian critical historicity elucidated 
above (191-92). Hence, she rises to defend it and dispel DHUULGD¶V FULWLTXH RI )RXFDXOW¶V
qualified and reworked ±yet reaffirmative ± account of the Hegelian notion of history in History 
of Madness. In fact, Allen suggests that it is Derrida who is committed to the transcendence of 
reason, unlike Foucault who is D ³WKHRULVW RI WKH LPPDQHQFH DQG FRQWLQJHQF\ RI VSHFific 




the unity of an original presence that precedes the split between reason and madness (Allen 
2016d: 109). Allen passes this verdict in spite of her awareness that the idea of the transcendent 
moment of reason and that of normative transcendence are analytically distinguishable (Allen 
2016d: 115). 
Against this background, one should ask: What is holding immanence and contingence 
WRJHWKHUDQGVWLOONHHSVWKHPGLVWLQFWLQ$OOHQ¶VDFFRXQWRI)RXFDXOGLDQKLVWRULFLW\"&RXOGLW
be the case that they are held together by a blind spot of Hegelian Entzweiung ± that is, a 
fragmentation of a previous unity, of the unity of unity and difference? (Pires 2002). Put 
GLIIHUHQWO\ DUHQ¶W LPPDQHQFH DQG FRQWLQJHQF\ VXVWDLQHG WRJHWKHU DQG DSDUW DV 'HUULGD
DUJXHGE\D³cleavage and torment interior to meaning in general, interior to logos in general, 
a division within the very act of sentire >RULHQWHG SHUFHSWLRQ@´" :KLFK LV WR VD\ $UHQ¶W
LPPDQHQFH DQG FRQWLQJHQF\ ³FRQVWLWXWHG´ E\ D EOLQG VSRW ZKLFK LV QRW WUDQVFHQGHQW Wo 
historical reason, as Allen claims, but is rather immanent (Derrida 2001: 45-46)? In this view, 
could it be that Derrida was indicating, contra Hegel, that the universality and immanence of 
reason does not entail immanent critique as the maxim guaranteeing the possibility and 
LPPDQHQWRSHUDELOLW\RIKLVWRU\¶VKLVWRULFLW\"$OOHQF: 130).  
To avoid any misunderstanding, Derrida concurs with Foucault that the mode of 
relation to actuality that we establish is itself historically determined and cannot be understood 
EXW WKURXJK SUREOHPDWL]LQJ RU ³GHFRQVWUXFWLQJ´ +LVWRU\ DV ZHOO DV KLVWRULFLW\¶V DOOHJHG
coherence. However, Derrida qualifies this observation historically by arguing that the problem 
OLHVQRWRQO\LQ+HJHO¶VSURJUHVVLYLVWFRQFHSWRI+LVWRU\(historicism as teleology), but also in 
the tools entailed for modern historiography and periodization (historicism as methodology), 
ZKLFKVKRXOGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGXQFRQWHVWDEOHJLYHQ³IDFWV´7KHODWWHUPLJKWDVZHOOEHWKH
³QRQKLVWRULFDO FDSLWDO RI KLVWRU\´ RU ZKDW JUDQWV KLVWRULFLW\ LWV SUHRUGDLQHG FUHGLW 'HUULGD
2001: 37-'HUULGD¶VRIW-TXRWHGTXLS³+HJHODJDLQDOZD\V´LVZKDWKDXQWVKLVZULWLQJV
RQ+LVWRU\¶VKLVWRULFLW\Derrida 2001: 43).  
)RXFDXOW¶VKHUFXOHDQFULWLFDOKLVWRULFL]DWLRQRI.DQW¶VSURMHFWRIFULWLFDOUHDVRQDQGRI
+HJHO¶VSURMHFWRIKLVWRULFDO UHDVRQ LVSUpFLVHG LQKLVRZQQRWLRQRI WKH historical a priori, 
which stands for a set of rules that characterize a discursive practice and that emanate only 
from practice itself. As FouFDXOWSXWV LW LW LV ³DFRQGLWLRQRI UHDOLW\ IRU VWDWHPHQWV´RU WKH






RXUKLVWRULFDODSULRUL´$FWXDOO\$OOHQVHHVLPPDQHQWHPDQcipatory critique as an effort 
WRHIIDFHWKH+LVWRULFDOFKDUDFWHURIRXUKLVWRULFDODSULRUL³RXWRIZKLFKRXUFRQWLQJHQWSUHVHQW
LV FRQVWUXFWHG´ -86). Nevertheless, this understanding of immanent critique hardly 
discharges the question of origins and divisions within history. Historicism as methodology 
cannot remain immune from itself, from the historical quality of its practice. Indeed, the 
historical method itself has a history. But as each new archaeology/problematizing genealogy 
attempts to critique certain forms of rationality and divisions within history, blind spots and 
VLQJXODULWLHVDUHLQHYLWDEO\JHQHUDWHGDQGWKXVQHYHU³UHJLVWHU´LQWKHKLVWRULFDODSULRUL7KH
LPSOLFDWLRQRIWKLVLQVLJKWLVWKDW\HWDQRWKHULWHUDWLRQRISUREOHPDWL]LQJD³FRndition of reality 
IRU VWDWHPHQWV´ FDQQRW DFFRXQW IRU EOLQG VSRWV WKDW this very work of critical historicity 
SURGXFHV &RQYHUVHO\ LW PLJKW ZHOO EH WKDW KLVWRULFLW\¶V EOLQG VSRWV DUH WKH FRQGLWLRQ RI
SRVVLELOLW\RIWKH³FRPSOH[YROXPH´RI³GLIIHUHQWW\SHV RISRVLWLYLW\´ 
The ceaseless repetitive drive of Hegelian historicism, which is supposedly only the 
hallmark of his historicism as teleology, does not wither away after Foucault purges it from his 
HDUO\ FULWLFDO PHWKRG 5DWKHU )RXFDXOW¶V FULWLFDO KLVWRricism as methodology sustains the 
expectation that the coming-to-true-knowledge signifies necessarily a repetition of the way of 
JHQHUDWLQJ³FRQGLWLRQ>V@RIUHDOLW\IRUVWDWHPHQWV´DQGDUHLWHUDWHGH[WHQVLRQRUVXEYHUVLRQRI
ZKDWWKH³FRPSOH[YROXPH´WKHUeof had already been. Hence, repetition is also a structuring 
form of Hegelian historicism as methodology. The business of reproblematizing historicity 
SURPSWV WKHUHIRUH UHSHWLWLRQ DV ZHOO DV VLQJXODU EOLQG VSRWV 'HUULGD¶V FULWLTXH FRQYH\V
precisely this ³injunction.´ 
This provisional reading signals that what is perhaps at stake in the Foucault-Derrida 
debate is not ³D IXQGDPHQWDO PHWKRGRORJLFDO GLVDJUHHPHQW DERXW KRZ WR GR FULWLFDO
SKLORVRSK\´DV$OOHQDUJXHVEXWUDWKHUDmere methodological disagreement in the form of a 
reservation: Hegel, probably not always (Allen 2016d: 106). Derrida unravels, in a subtle 
PDQQHUWKH*RUGLDQNQRWEHWZHHQLPPDQHQWFULWLTXHDQGUHDVRQ¶VLPPDQHQFHWKDWERWKWKH
HDUO\ )RXFDXOW DQG WKH )UDQNIXUW 6FKRRO ³LQKHULWHG´ IURP +HJHO¶V GLDOHFWLFDO VFKHPH RI
historicity. Derrida does subscribe to the immanence of reason and does acknowledge the 
primacy of historical reason; yet at the same time, contra Hegel and early Foucault, he casts 
suspicion on the immanent nature of the critique of historical reason and calls for heightened 
awareness to the possibility of historicity-of-history as such (Derrida 1998, 2001). Dumping 
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SULRULWKURXJKWKHHDUO\)RXFDXOW¶Vmethodological historicism) falters because it cannot secure 
the immanence of its critical work. Radical Hegelian historicism as methodology retains a 
built-LQSURSHQVLW\WRDPDOJDPDWLQJEOLQGVSRWVGXHWRLWV³SUHGLVSRVHG´Aufhebung thrust. In 
DQXWVKHOOZHPLJKWFDOOWKLV$OOHQ¶V+HJHOLDQ³&DWFK-´ 
7RFRQFOXGH$OOHQ¶VJURXQGEUHDNLQJFULWLTXHRISURJUHVVPDNHVVHnse insofar as it 
channels the capacity to perform an immanent critique that is normatively valid in specific 
contexts. That is, a form of critique that maintains or even reinvigorates Critical Theory¶V
quest for emancipation. However, while seeking and prescribing normative progress as a 
maxim for our emancipatory praxis, we must bear in mind a caveat underscored in the works 
of Derrida, Benjamin and the late Foucault: the association of progress or its critique with 
either pessimism or optimism in future emancipation might be misplaced (Brown 2001). If 
Critical Theory wishes to retain ± dare I say ± D³FROOHFWLYH´HPDQFLSDWRU\LQWHQWRUWR
otherwise decolonize its normative foundations, it must first think how to bracket the 
LQWXLWLQJRIKLVWRULFLW\¶VVWUucture of repetition, and then reflect on emancipation in the 
absence of the possibility of normative progress and the consequences entailed for Critical 
Theory¶VPHWKRG of ³LPPDQHQWFULWLTXH´ 
 
On Our Situated Standpoints 
Noëlle McAfee 
 
$P\$OOHQ¶VJRDOLQThe End of Progress LVWZRIROG³WRGHFRORQL]HFULWLFDOWKHRU\´DQGWR
FULWLFDOL]HSRVWFRORQLDOWKHRU\WRVHHKRZLW³PLJKWUHVSRQGWRORQJ-standing charges of 
UHODWLYLVP>DQG@«WKHQRUPDWLYHVWDWXVRILWVFULWLTXH´:KDWSUHYHQWVcurrent critical 




SURJUHVV´DUHGHSOR\HGWRSURYLGHDIRRWLQJIRUVWDQGDUGVRIFULWLTXe, which, though 
supposedly universal are really, she argues, particular, namely Eurocentric. Critical theorists 
locate these standards immanently and historically in particular forms of life²modern 
ones²but still attempt to use them transcendentally to do FULWLFDOWKHRU\7R)RUVW¶VPRUH
Kantian approach, Allen deploys a criticism of its universality.) In a certain sense, 
contemporary critical theory has wanted things both ways: critique founded immanently yet 
also critique that can transcend cultures in order to be able to critically reflect back on those 
cultures. The worry is that if we lack transcendental grounds for critique then anything goes. 
Without transcendence, that is, truths that are not merely context dependent, we are on a dire 
path to relativism, shorn of weapons for criticism. 
In the background of the book there are these dichotomies: On the one side 
objectivity, transcendence and the capacity for critique without metaphysics (about which 
Allen is very sceptical) and on the other the slippery slope of relativism that can easily slide 
into skepticism, maybe even nihilism, and an unwillingness to engage in critical inquiry 
across cultures. Along with many critical theorists today, Allen takes to the barricades against 
relativism, insisting with every mention of it that she will not go there where surely danger 
lurks. So she is treading shaky ground, trying to dispense with a conception of progress 
(which she sees as a self-congratulatory Eurocentric claim about how far we western moderns 
have come, providing a normative footing for future critique) without losing all capacity for 
critique (relativism). But where Allen mans the barricades against relativism, I have long 
wondered outright whether critical theory might be able to acknowledge relativism and still 
SUHVHUYHFULWLFDOWKHRU\¶VSRZHU  
This all reminds me of an interview I conducted twenty years ago with Richard Rorty 
for a public affairs television program (McAfee 1997). With these sorts of worries in mind, I 
asked Rorty the same question from many different directions, 
x How can people from one culture criticize the norms of another culture if there is 
potentially nothing that they share? 
x How does a culture change its own norms if there is nothing transcending the culture 
itself? 
x How can competing claims be adjudicated? 




Rorty responded by drawing on John Dewey and Habermas, saying that with them he 
EHOLHYHGSHRSOHDUULYHDWZKDWWKH\FDOOWUXWKWKRXJKKHGRHVQ¶WFDOOLWWUXWKWKURXJKWKHLU
deliberations not about principles but about consequences²and that there was no way to 
independently decide whether their views were justified or not. Rorty was skeptical about 
SHRSOH¶VDELOLW\WRDGMXGLFDWHEHWZHHQYDOXHVKHDWWULEXWHGWKHDELOLW\WRFULWLFL]HRQH¶VRZQ
culture, to set aside self-interest, and the like only somewhat jokingly as miracles or lightning 
bolts. Asked about religious funGDPHQWDOLVPVXFKDVWKH7DOLEDQ¶VLQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQGKRZLW
treats women, he had nothing to say. Moreover, he could not see how philosophy could help 
SHRSOHILQGDQ\FRPPRQJURXQG³+XPDQEHLQJVDUHFUHDWXUHVRIWKHLUFXOWXUHV´KHVDLG
whether fascists or liberal democrats. And only through luck might they or their children 
change. Throughout the interview, Rorty held that we are products of our cultures, that the 





the skeptic (Allen 2016a: IRUWHUPLQDWLQJKLV³PHPEHUVKLSLQWKHFRPPXQLW\RIEHLQJV
ZKRDUJXH´+DEHUPDVPD\ZHOOKDYHKDG5RUW\LQPLQG%XW5RUW\GHVSLte his protestations 
against philosophy, was being a relativist as only a philosopher would: insisting practically 
on principle that, almost objectively, nothing can be true or justified. This is why relativism 
seems to pose such a danger, for it seems to lead straight toward quietism and a refusal to 
make any judgments at all. With Habermas, I would agree that Rorty was opting out of the 
community of people who argue. (To be fair, in his later work he did opt back in to the 
conversation.)  
But as William James points out, this kind of radical skepticism is not an alternative 
to certainty and absolutism but the flip side of the same coin where everything rises or falls 
on the need for certainty. The philosopher committed to one side of the coin sees the only 
DOWHUQDWLYHDVWKHRSSRVLWHVLGH+HDQGLW¶VRIWHQDKHFDQQRWDGPLWWRDQ\RWKHUDOWHUQDWLYH 




experience, not willy-nilly arbitrary ones. From this kind of relativist picture, the liberal 
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democrat who encounters the fascist has plenty to say, and vice versa. Each has convictions, 
and each may well engage in heated conversation about why their own view is right and the 
RWKHU¶VLVZrong. 
Allen draws on Adorno to go in this very direction, to show that relativism and 
absolutism are actually correlates. 6KHTXRWHV$GRUQR³)RUWKHSRVLWLYHQDWXUHRIEHOLHIVRI
ideologies, that prevail here and now is not relative at all. They confront us at every moment 
DVELQGLQJDQGDEVROXWH´$OOHQ¶VRZQYLHZSRLQWVLQWKHVDPHGLUHFWLRQWRZDUGD
metanormative contextualism that is also beyond the absolutism-relativism dichotomy. 
Metanormatively, the person engaged in debates across cultures can be fully aware that her 
standards and methods are derived from within her culture. By seeing this new kind of 
relationVKLSEHWZHHQRXU³PHWDQRUPDWLYHDQGQRUPDWLYHFRPPLWPHQWV´$OOHQZULWHV³ZH
could understand ourselves, at a first-order, substantive normative level, to be committed to 




can do so fully aware that her own presuppositions have emerged from a particular, say 
western, position. She will not presume that her ways of knowing and deciding are 
universally true, though she might firmly believe that they are better than other ways of 
knowing. Something like this is what I was trying to get from Rorty: an acknowledgment that 
even though we may not meet eye-to-eye with others, while there might indeed be a plurality 
of views and differences of opinion about their relative validity, there still might be a way to 
talk with and woo others to see merits in our own convictions. 
Many critical theorists DUHSURQHWRKHDULQWKHZRUG³UHODWLYLVP´WKHRWKHURIFHUWDLQW\
and rationality; that is, relativism seems to mean an inability to adjudicate. I suggest we hear 
in it instead ideas such as pluralism and perspectivalism, situated standpoints from which we 
come to see the world richly and deeply. Pluralism captures the fact that there are many 
perspectives and hence accounts of what is and is not. Pluralism is the condition that gives 
rise to the need for politics, that is, for the practice of deciding what ought to be done in the 
face of disagreement. Perspectivalism captures the fact that people see things a certain way, 
not an arbitrary way, from where they happen to sit. Everyone in this room has a very definite 




U, and also just as any postcolonial criticism can test and challenge universalist claims that 
emanate from a Eurocentric view. In my view, we critical theorists do not need to purge 
ourselves of particularism, even any residual Eurocentrism, but recognize and use our 
multiple perspectives.  
Neither perspectivalism nor pluralism denies the capacity for people to, as Arendt put 
LW³JRYLVLWLQJ´RWKHUSRLQWVRIYLHZWRUHIOHFWRQWKHLURZQSRLQWVRIYLHZRUWRPDNHPRUDO
and political judgments along the lines that Forst and Honneth might support. Maybe human 
beings are wired to make judgments, or at least as those we have encountered in our 
philosophical anthropological investigations of those forms of life we know about 
contextually. Some might want to postpone such a political understanding until we can 
ground it non-tautologically, but then they would be waiting indefinitely for Godot. 
 
I close with these observations: First, perhaps metanormative contextualism does not 
require adherents of a philosophical view to state up front that their view is contextual, that is, 
emerging from some particular and not normative position. For example, since Habermas 
already concedes that his theory emerges from what modernity has accomplished, it does not 
VHHPQHFHVVDU\HYHQDFFRUGLQJWR$OOHQ¶VFULWHULDWKDWKHDOVRQRWHWKDWKLVYLHZLV
contextual. If that is so, Allen need not find fault his view, but instead use it as a case for her 
RZQSRVLWLRQ6HFRQGFRQWUDU\WR$OOHQ¶VZRUU\WKDWDSOXUDOLW\RIIRUPVRIFULWLTXHPD\VWRS
other forms of discourse in their track, critics from the underside of history, such as Enrique 
Dussel, find multiple lines of critique and discourse to be tremendously helpful for social 
struggle. Likewise, Iris Young famously warned in her early essay on communicative 
democracy that critical theory needs more than one form of deliberation. Where deliberators 
in suits often sidelined alternative practices such as greeting, rhetoric, and storytelling, her 
call for communicative democracy includes valuing these other forms of discourse. So 
finally, I wonder if Allen could simply read Habermas, Honneth, and Forst as already in fact 
engaging in a contextualist project that is not terribly different from her own. The project then 
could be to offer a new, contextualist understanding of what critical theory is actually doing, 









book on the subject, I was surprised on reading in the first chapter that she intended to ignore 
WKHUROHRIVFLHQFHDQGWHFKQRORJ\$EULHIPHQWLRQRI%UXQR/DWRXU¶VFODLPWKDW³:H+DYH
1HYHU%HHQ0RGHUQ´MXVWLILHVWKLVHOLVLRQ%XWKRZGRHVRQHGLVFXVVSURJUHVVZLWKRXW
mentioning science and technology? The very idea of normative progress rests on an analogy 
to scientific-technical progress. Only if the latter can be explained in the local, future oriented 
terms Allen approves can the former be effectively reformulated on those terms. Mainstream 
political theory is formulated as though its technical basis were an exogenous variable. This 
is what makes it possible to discuss norms without reference to technical rationality. This 
makes no sense in modern societies structured by technology and other rational systems such 
as markets and administrations, what I cDOOIRUVKRUWWKH³WHFKQRV\VWHP´ (Feenberg 2017). 
Overlooked is the fact that progress is often realized essentially through technosystem change 
rather than the legal and policy changes that are the focus of political theory. Treating the 
technical conditions of progress as external accidents, happily present when needed, obscures 
the role of democratic struggles in changing the technical base itself. 
Consider, for example, the Black Lives Matter protests. Few doubt that there are racist 
police officers in the United States, and that this is one of the sources of the problem. Nor is 
there any dispute about the rights of black victims of extra-judicial killings by police. But 
given the difficulty of changing attitudes toward race, racism cannot be the primary focus of 
reform. At issue are technical and administrative measures such as body cameras, training in 
the use of lethal force, and effective disciplinary procedures. The system must be redesigned 
under public pressure regardless of the attitudes of individual officers. That would be an 
instance of the local progress Allen invokes as a substitute for global progress. It is 
inextricably entangled with the technosystem. 
There iVDQRWKHUSUREOHPZLWK$OOHQ¶VDUJXPHQW$QHIIHFWLYHFULWLTXHRI
(XURFHQWULVPPXVWGHDOZLWKWKHHYLGHQWIDFWWKDWWKHZKROHZRUOGKDVDFFHSWHG(XURSH¶V
scientific-technical superiority in the last two centuries. To be sure this is a contingent fact 
and neither epistemologically nor normatively decisive, but what a fact! It has created a 
world in which global corporations apply modern scientific-technical methods only to be 
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contested by critics and popular movements that demand alternative applications of the same 
modern scientific-technical methods. This is not to say that premodern sciences and 
techniques contain no useful knowledge, but for the most part that knowledge becomes 
effective today where it is combined with modern scientific-technical knowledge in hybrid 
forms.  
Eurocentrism intrudes on the lifeworld of non-European societies primarily through 
capitalism and technology rather than normative claims. These are the forces transforming 
life throughout the world, often with little regard for the needs and rights of peoples. It is true 
that normative ideals such as democracy are also imposed on non-Western societies, but this 
is not a wholly independent aspect of the process of Westernization. In fact, more often than 
QRWGHPRFUDWLFQRUPVDUH³PHWDEROL]HG´HIIHFWLYHO\E\QRQ-Western nations and become 
channels for the expression of traditional power relations while legitimating capitalist 
development.  
Allen agrees in advance that consideration of sociotechnical issues may be required to 
complete her argument. This is a challenging task that will require much further work. Here 
are two examples. $OOHQFULWLFL]HV$[HO+RQQHWK¶VFODLPWKDWQRUPDWLYHDGYDQFHKDVDQ
irreversible character because it remains in the collective social memory. For both Habermas 
and Honneth it is specifically the disentanglement of reason from power that cannot be 
IRUJRWWHQ7KH³OHDUQLQJSURFHVV´LVXQLGLUHFWLRQDOHYHQLIUHJUHVVLRQPD\RFFXUDWRWKHU
levels. Is this really the way things work? Is the normative force of the abolition of slavery 
primarily perpetuated in social memory? I do not think so. Is it simply an effect of what 
)RXFDXOWFDOOV³VRYHUHLJQSRZHU"´$JDLQWKLVFDQQRWEHULJKW7KLVLVDQRUPDWLYHDGYDQFH
that has been realized in social, educational, legal, economic and technological arrangements 
so thoroughly and deeply that regression is inconceivable. Put another way, neither memory 
nor power has the power to make a normative advance irreversible. For that it must be 
embedded in what Foucault called thH³FDSLOODULHV´RIVRFLHW\7KLVWDNHVSODFHKHDUJXHV
through a specifically modern form of power that is dispersed and impersonal. 
7KHH[DPSOHRIVODYHU\VKRZVWKDWQRUPVDUHQRWVHSDUDWHIURPWKH³IDFWV´EHFDXVH
they must be confirmed by the existing sociotechnical arrangements to be effective. Nor are 





that Allen and other critical theorists dissatisfied with Habermas are attempting to overcome 
his ethical formalism without a similar concrete basis in the social world. But the example of 
VODYHU\VKRZVZK\WKHVHDWWHPSWVDUHXQFRQYLQFLQJ(WKLFDO³VXEVWDQFH´WRGD\LVWHFKQLFDOO\
inflected. Not only are we as subjects products of a world in which slavery was abolished, the 
world as object has been transformed in response to this normative achievement. The 
achievement is verifiable from both first and third person standpoints, both in our psyches 
and in our technical arrangements. The entanglement of norm and fact is ineradicable.  
7KLVDUJXPHQWUHLQIRUFHV$OOHQ¶VFULWLTXHRI+RQQHWK, and it also helps to explain an 
DVSHFWRIKHUDUJXPHQWZLWK)RUVW)RUVWEHOLHYHVWKDWVRFLDOOLIHWDNHVSODFHLQD³VSDFHRI
UHDVRQV´LQZKLFKMXVWLILFDWLRQVDUHRIIHUHGDQGUHFHLYHG7KHH[HUFLVHRISRZHURQWKLV
account would involve limiting the reasons to which agents can respond to those favoring 
obedience. Allen objects that Forst overlooks the problem of the constitution of subjectivity 
which she elucidates in terms of a Foucauldian theory of social practices. Foucault holds that 
subjects become the subjects they are through the practices determined by the power relations 
in which they participate. If the subjects who enter the space of reasons are pre-constituted in 
some sense to respond to power, reason and power cannot be separated. One might even say 
that reason is simply a supplement of power that power gives itself. 
This argument does not take account of the ambiguous effect of the practices on the 
constitution of the subject. As Albena Azmanova (2012) shows, practices do not determine 
the subject in some simple sense, but set up a common ground of expectations, concepts and 
rankings. The normative implications of the practices are internalized and frame the context 
of public debate. This frame establishes the categories that are relevant in the space of 
reasons and makes communication about them possible. The framing opens a field of 
possibilities. If the practices cause enough suffering, they can be challenged by contesting the 
rules in terms of the very categories they have made relevant. This can trigger further changes 
in the orientation underpinning the space of reasons, altering the boundaries of validity. New 
constellations of valid reasons arise from and alter social practices. 7KXV$OOHQ¶VUHIHUHQFHWR
the constitution of the subject needs to be completed by a consideration of the constitution of 
the space of reasons subjects are called to enter. The contextuality of rationality manifests 
itself in what can be taken as a reason in the space of reasons. In modern societies, the 
boundaries of that space are laid out by the practices embedded in the rational order of 
society. Finding the fissures and cracks through which alternatives can enter into the relation 
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of subjects to these systems is not a simple matter. We must follow the tracks of discontents, 
pathologies, and social movements. 
7KH)RXFDXOGLDQWKHRU\RISRZHULQWURGXFHVDWHQVLRQLQ$OOHQ¶VDUJXPHQWVKHGRHV
not acknowledge. His concept of power is quite different from the sovereign power from 
which the Enlightenment attempted to disentangle truth. It corresponds to the impersonal 
power of the market Marx identified in the capitalist system, as contrasted with the personal 
power of feudal society. Colonialism involved a confusing mix of both types of power. 
Conflating the two types risks reducing reason to power. Romantic irrationalism would then 
challenge technocratic rationalism, a conclusion of some post-colonial arguments. As a 
critical theorist, Allen must reject that conclusion. She defends the idea that progress can 
occur locally through reforms that respond to rational norms. Although gender issues are the 
only ones she mentions prominently, I take it that she would include among worthy reforms 
the achievements of many progressive movements, such as environmentalism, movements for 
ZRUNHUV¶ULJKWVGLVDEOHGULJKWVFULPLQDOMXVWLFHUHIRUPSURWHFWLRQRISULYDF\DQGIUHH
speech, protests against economic and racial inequality, and so on.  
But many of these struggles take place primarily on the terrain of technical rationality. 
ThLVVXJJHVWVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIDFULWLTXHRI+DEHUPDV¶VV\VWHPWKHRU\ZKLFKLVFOHDUO\
inadequate to explain such struggles. Let me sketch an alternative view. The apotheosis of 
instrumental rationality has the effect of elevating functionality from a specialized attribute of 
certain artifacts into an ontological principle. But this is not a pure functionality such as 
+HLGHJJHUPLJKWFRQFHLYHQRULVLW+DEHUPDVLDQ³V\VWHPUDWLRQDOLW\´FOHDQVHGRIQRUPDWLYH
bias. The functionality that prevails in actual social life reflects the dominant culture, the 
perspective on experience that guides the selection of useful properties. The functional 
transformation of society imposes ends privileged by the means that organize social life and 
those means bear the mark of capitalism. Thus the technosystem is not neutral, available to 
serve any conception of the good life whatsoever, but always already embodies a particular 
conception in its design.  
As ever more efficient means are developed and extend to more and more domains of 
social life, the ends they are designed to serve are called into question by those who do not 
share the presuppositions that presided over their selection. Conflicts subvert the consensus 
around instrumental rationality in practice if not in theory. And since the realities revealed in 
the conflict of functional form and living human content cannot be represented by an 
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effective worldview of the traditional sort, some other solution to the problem of social order 
must be found. That alternative is emerging today; it is democratic struggle and dialogue in 
the domain of the technosystem (Feenberg 1999: part ii). 
Technical artifacts and systems are situated in the lifeworld where they are 
appropriated or suffered by ordinary people. They become objects of explicit normative 
judgment when they cause problems. Those judgments do not respect the separation of facts 
and norms, system and lifeworld assumed by Habermasian Critical Theory. In technosystem 
struggles rational concepts that have been refined and clarified in the technical disciplines are 
deployed in their original lifeworldly form. The design process is reactivated through 
interventions based on the concepts as they appear in the lifeworld. These vernacular versions 
of the rational concepts differ from the refined expert versions in being charged with explicit 
QRUPDWLYHFRQWHQW³3XULW\´KDVDWHFKQLFDOPHDQLQJIRUWKRVHZKRPDQage water systems, 
but the same concept deployed by the citizens of Flint has normative implications as well. 
Such concepts support what Foucault calls "subjugated knowledges," and can be invoked 
critically to realize such potentialities as health and justice. Thus rationality is ambivalent and 
can provide a basis not only for technical work but also for normative critique. 
This approach builds a bridge between early Critical Theory and contemporary theory 
and practice. It situates struggles over the technosystem in a larger historical context in which 
the imperatives of capitalism have determined criteria of technical advance contested by 
democratic interventions. Subjugated knowledges arise from the technosystem and motivate 
struggles over oppression and injustice. Experience within the technosystem assumes a 
rational form capable of interacting with technical expertise. In many domains this is the 
meaning of progress today.  
 
 
The Ends of Progress: Reply to Critics 
Amy Allen 
 
The contributions to this critical exchange challenge me from a variety of different theoretical 
directions and orientations and focus on a dizzying array of issues, from politics to historical 
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methodology to the possibility of cross-cultural moral and political judgments to the role of 
science and technology in my discussion of progress. In what follows, I fear I will not be able 
to do justice to all of the issues that they raise. Instead, I will focus on what I take to be main 
lines of critique, clarifying and defending my position where I can; but in some cases I will 
not be able to do much more than to acknowledge my own limitations.  
Martin Saar expresses deep skepticism about what he takes to be the primary 
UHFRQVWUXFWLYHDLPRIP\ERRNZKLFKLVWRVKRZWKDW³SURJUHVVFDQEHUHFRYHUHGDVDEDVLV
as a different, recovered foundation. Critical Theory can remain founded on progress, if 
XQGHUVWRRGGLIIHUHQWO\´5HODWHGWRthis, Saar wonders whether my distinction between 
backward and forward-looking conceptions of progress can really be sustained and 
systematically defended, and suggests that there is a lingering problem with my attempt to 
retain a forward-looking notion of progress, one that results in a lingering idealism that 
UHQGHUVP\IUDPHZRUNXQDEOHWRWKLQNKLVWRULFDOFRQWLQJHQF\$VKHSXWVLW³WDONLQJSURJUHVV
means talking continuity, and this implies linking past, present and futurity in a substantial, 
continuouVZD\´7KXV6DDUPDLQWDLQVWKDWE\KDQJLQJRQWRWKHLGHDRIWKHSRVVLELOLW\RI
progress in the future, I am necessarily committing myself to a substantial philosophy of 
history and thus to a strong continuity thesis ± in other words, the notion of progress just 
FDQ¶WEHEURNHQDSDUWLQWKHZD\WKDW,VXJJHVW+HDOVRLQVLVWVWKDWFULWLFDOWKHRULVWVVLPSO\
GRQ¶WQHHGWKHFRQFHSWRISURJUHVVWRGRWKHNLQGRIZRUNWKDW,FODLPWKHIRUZDUG-looking 
notion of progress does ± DOWHUQDWLYHVOLNH³OHDUQLQJ´³RULHQWDWLRQ´RU³SROLWLFV´PLJKWGR
just as well. My inability to let go of even a vestigial notion of progress represents, in his 
eyes, a failure of nerve on my part.  
6DDU¶VVNHSWLFLVPLVJURXQGHGLQKLVUHDGLQJRI%HQMDPLQDQG)RXFDXOWERWKRIZKRP
argue that we should be skeptical about thinking history as progress even in a forward-
looking sense. If we follow this lineage of critical theory, then, Saar maintains, the true 
FKDOOHQJHEHFRPHVKRZ³WRUHQRXQFHWKHYHU\LGHDRISURJUHVVDVDKLVWRULFDOFDWHJory, as 
something within history that could be known, SUHVXSSRVHGRUJXDUDQWHHG´Furthermore, 
)RXFDXOWHVSHFLDOO\KHOSVXVWRVHHWKDWZHGRQ¶WQHHGWKHFRQFHSWRISURJUHVVIRU
FRQWHPSRUDU\SROLWLFDOVWUXJJOHVDOOZHQHHGLV³WKHLGHDDQGWKHSUDFWLFHRf politics, or 
FROOHFWLYHDFWLRQRUHPDQFLSDWLRQ´WKRXJKWZLWKRXWEDQLVWHUVZKLFKLVWRVD\XQGHUVWRRGLQ
a truly contingent and ungrounded sense. It is interesting to me that Saar leaves Adorno out 
RIWKLVDOWHUQDWLYHJHQHDORJ\VLQFH$GRUQR¶VZRUNLV crucial for my attempt to break up the 




progressed up to now is utterly indefensible in light of the barbarity of the Holocaust, to give 
up on the possibility of progress in the future would be to wallow in conservative despair. I 
agree wholeheartedly with Saar that whatever understanding of progress might be recovered 
in the wake of its ongoing and persistent critique will have to jettison claims to continuity and 
unity within history, and furthermore that it will have to be measured and assessed according 
to criteria that are themselves understood as contingent foundations, which means that 
whatever we might take to count as an instance of progress will always stand in need of 
IXUWKHURQJRLQJJHQHDORJLFDOSUREOHPDWL]DWLRQ%XW,¶PQRWFRQYLQFHG± at least not yet ± that 
such a recovery is impossible.  
Insofar as we disagree, some of our disagreement seems to me to stem from what I 
WDNHWREH6DDU¶VPLV-characterization of the aim of my project. By saying that my aim is to 
recover progress as a foundation for critical theory, perhaps Saar is just trying to capture my 
endorsement of the idea that critical theory in some way requires a forward-looking 
understanding of progress in order to be critical ± that is, it requires some conception of if not 
the good society then at least the less oppressive or less unjust society. But does saying this 
mean that forward-looking progress becomes the foundation for critical theory, in my view? I 
GRQ¶WVHHZK\,ZRXOGVD\UDWKHUWKDWP\DLPLVWRUHWKLQNWKHFRQFHSWLRQRIQRUPDWLYLW\LQ
critical theory in a contextualist and genealogical mode, which means that whatever 
³IRXQGDWLRQ´LVDUWLFXODWHGKHUHLVQRWSURJUHVVEXWUDWKHUWKHPHWKRGRIJHQHDORJLFDO
problematization. To be sure, I maintain that this conception of normativity preserves the 
possibility of making normative claims ± including claims about what we might take, here 
and now, to count as progress in the future ± and I do see this as important for critical theory. 
$VDQDVLGH,VXVSHFWWKDW6DDUGRHVDVZHOORUHOVH,¶PQRWVXUHKRZWRUHDGKLVUHIHUHQFHV
to things like learning and emancipation.) But this is a contingent foundation, and on this I 
think that Saar and I agree. 
As I see it, once we have this conception of normativity in place, it can underwrite the 
reading of history in terms of progress, but only in a very local and contextual way. In other 
words, on the genealogical-contextualist account of normativity, progress cannot serve as a 
means of justifying our normative criteria, but it is possible that judgments about progress or 
regress may be entailed once we have adopted certain (contextually grounded) normative 
SULQFLSOHVWKLVLVZKDW,WU\WRFDSWXUHZLWKP\GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ³KLVWRULFDOSURJUHVV´DQG
³SURJUHVVLQKLVWRU\´VHH$OOHQD: 225-229). Does this commit me to an idealist, 
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substantial, and continuous philosophy of history? Although I would admit that I probably 
GRQ¶WGRHQRXJKZRUNLQWKHERRNWRHODERUDWHDQGGHIHQGWKLVGLVWLQFWLRQ,GRQ¶WVHHZK\
this would be the case. Perhaps I give too much credence to a certain kind of transcendental 
argument, advanced by Rainer Forst, which holds that one cannot be against progress without 
also being for it. In other words, even the critique of progress as an ideological and implicitly 
imperialist concept itself relies on some notion of progress, insofar as this critique holds that 
LWZRXOGEHEHWWHULIZHFRXOGH[SXQJHFULWLFDOWKHRU\RIWKLVLGHRORJLFDOQRWLRQ6WLOO,GRQ¶W
WKLQNWKDWP\UHVSRQVHWRWKLVDUJXPHQWFRPPLWVPHWRDFODLPDERXWWKH³UHDOSRVVLELlity of 
WKLQJVJHWWLQJEHWWHU´, that is, to a substantial claim about continuity within history. For better 
or for worse, what I have in mind with the notion of progress in history is a much thinner, 
less substantial view about what is entailed conceptually and normatively by certain types of 
critical claims. In the end, though, I think that progress in history means more or less what 
Saar calls politics: it refers to local and specific instances of emancipation, where this is 
understood as the minimization of domination, carried out in light of normative criteria that 
are contingently and contextually grounded and that, as such, always stand in need of 
ongoing genealogical problematization. 
Echoing some similar themes, Guilel Treiber worries about my lack of attention to the 
specifically political and suggests that my approach ultimately fails to heed important 
Foucaultian insights. Treiber contends that my reading of Foucault brings him too close to 
Adorno, with the effect losing sight of the specifically political and activist dimensions of 
)RXFDXOW¶VZRUN2Q7UHLEHU¶VUHDGLQJ,DWWDFKWKHLOOXPLQDWLRQRIOLQHVRIIUDJLOLW\DQG
IUDFWXUHWR³WKRXJKWLWVHOIWRWKHHPDQFLSDWRU\SRWHQWLDORISKLORVRSK\DQGQHYHUWRDFWXDO
lived experience, to practices or institutions, as Foucault repeatedly tried to do throughout his 
ZRUN´. Moreover, and relatedly, Treiber worries that I ascribe to Foucault a Frankfurt School 
critical theoretical view about the relation between theory and practice that he himself would 
not (maybe even did not) accept.  
7UHLEHU¶VUDGLFDOGHHply political reading of my book calls attention to one of its 
obvious limitations. There is no doubt that he is correct to point out that my book does not 
pay sustained attention to questions of political praxis. The primary aim and energy of the 
book lies elsewhere, in developing a conception of normativity that can be gleaned, at least in 
SDUWLQ)RXFDXOW¶VZRUN%XW,¶PQRWVXUHWKDWLWLVIDLUWRVD\WKDW,DPFRPPLWWHGWRWKH




fact, I am somewhat skeptical of the idea that critical theory has a privileged relationship to 
praxis ± I have explored in great detail in my earlier work the ways in which critique is far 
from sufficient for practical political transformation (Allen 2008); more recently, I have 
ZRQGHUHGZKHWKHULWLVHYHQQHFHVVDU\VHH$OOHQE,QDQ\FDVH,¶PLQFOLQHGWRDJUHH
with Treiber that there are many cases in which theory lags behind radical political 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQVVWUXJJOLQJWRFDWFKXSDQGPDNHVHQVHRIWKHPDIWHUWKHIDFWDQG,GRQ¶WVHH
how that view is incompatible with the argument of my book.  
However, none of that skepticism requires rejection of the claim that theory is itself a 
NLQGRISUDFWLFH)RUZKDWLWLVZRUWK,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWWKHUH¶VDQ\GRXEWWKDW)RXFDXOW
accepted some version of this claim. Why else would he have claimed that all of his books 
are experiences, that is, designed and composed to have a transformative effect on both their 
author and their readers (Foucault 1997a: 239ff)? This at least suggests that there is, for 
Foucault, a meaningful sense in which critique can open up a space of freedom, not solely in 
WKHRU\EXWDOVRLQSUDFWLFHHYHQLIRQHDGPLWVWKDWWKHRU\FDQ¶WE\LWVHOIGRDOORIWKHZRUN
required to achieve political transformation and that such transformations sometimes outrun 
our best critical theories, forcing us to play catchup. Moreover, it seems to me that Treiber 
KLPVHOILPSOLFLWO\DFNQRZOHGJHVWKLVSRLQWZKHQKHLQVLVWVRQFKDUDFWHUL]LQJ)RXFDXOW¶VZRUN
as a historian ± which is, after all, a type of critical-intellectual work, not a directly political 
praxis. Treiber is quite right that tKHSRLQWRI)RXFDXOW¶VZRUNDVDKLVWRULDQLVQRWRQO\WR
FKDOOHQJH+HJHOLDQSKLORVRSKLHVRIKLVWRU\EXWDOVRWR³FDSWXUHWKHPDUJLQDOYRLFHVWKDW
officiaO+LVWRU\KDVIDLOHGWRHUDVH´DQG³WRJLYHEDFNDYRLFHWRWKRVHZKRPRIILFLDOKLVWRry 
KDVIRUJRWWHQ´. I think Treiber is quite right to point out that I could have done more to reflect 
RQWKLVDVSHFWRI)RXFDXOW¶VFULWLFDOKLVWRULFDOSUDFWLFHLQOLJKWRISRVWFRORQLDOFRQFHUQV%XW
notice that Treiber is here implicitly assuming that Foucault critical-historical work has a 
political point and impact. I agree, and something like this is what I had in mind in talking 
about critique as opening up a space of freedom.  
Unlike Saar and Treiber, both of whom seem to worry that I am not Foucaultian 
enough, Azar Dakwar aims to develop a Derridean critique of both the early Foucault and the 
use that I make of him in my book. Like Saar, Dakwar presses this reading in order to pose 
the broader question of whether the aspiration of emancipation from domination must 
presuppose or entail any notion of progress and to worry that my view has not fully expunged 
the residues of Hegelian philosophy of history. His sophisticated and nuanced critique turns 
around two specific points: first, his claim that the early Foucault and I both fail to 
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distinguish between historicism as teleology with historicism as methodology, rejecting the 
first while implicitly accepting the second, thus remaining stuck within a Hegelian historical 
framework; second, his contention that the early Foucault and I both endorse a problematic 
strategy for the immanentizing of reason, history, and critique, one that fails to take seriously 
the ways in which immanence and contingency may be held together by a blind spot 
immanent to (historical) reason itself. DDNZDU¶VFRPPHQWVWXUQLQSDUWRQWKHTXHVWLRQRI
how best to read Derrida on the notion of historicity and whether it is fair to charge that his is 
an ahistorical conception of history (as Adorno might have said) that is incapable of 
comprehending the sheer contingency and radically discontinuous and transformative 
character of the historical event (as Foucault did say).  
6LQFH,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWKHUHLVWKHSODFHWRGHEDWHWKHILQHSRLQWVRI'HUULGD
interpretation ± nor do I feel particularly well qualified to do so, since I would not describe 
P\VHOIDVDQH[SHUWRQ'HUULGD¶VZRUN± I will instead focus on what Dakwar takes to be the 
payoff of his Derridean critique of my book. As far as I can tell, the payoff is the claim that 
the immanent critique of Hegelian historicism found in the early Foucault and in Frankfurt 
School Critical Theory remains too immanent, too internal to a Hegelian conception of 
history, and thus that this conception is condemned merely to repeat the underlying logic and 
structure of that conception. Insofar as this conception of critique hangs on to historicism as a 
core component of its methodology, it is ultimately incapable of breaking out of the 
teleological Hegelianism that it criticizes.  
A great deal of the argument thus hangs on the characterization of Foucault as a 
methodological historicist in the relevant sense. Dakwar does not say much about what he 
PHDQVE\WKLVEXWWKHFRUHSRLQWVHHPVWREHWKHSUHVXPSWLRQRIWKH³WRROVRIPRGHUQ
historiography and pHULRGL]DWLRQ´. AlthouJK)RXFDXOW¶VZRUNLVYHU\FORVHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWK
the emergence of new historicism in literary and cultural studies, and although the Annales 
School that was deeply formative for his intellectual development bears a complex 
relationship to historicism, it is important to keep in mind that Foucault is first and foremost a 
KLVWRULDQRIWKHSUHVHQW7KXV,¶PQRWVXUHLWPDNHVVHQVHWRFKDUDFWHUL]HKLPDVDKLVWRULFLVW
in any straightforward sense of the term. Rather, as I argue in the book, his deployment of a 
specifically historical methodology seems to me to be contingently motivated. It is because of 
the grip that historical self-consciousness has on the modern historical a priori that Foucault 
feels compelled to work with historical tools, but the aim of this critical work is to open that 
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historical a priori up to radical transformation ± which may entail a transformation to a point 
of view from which the very notion of historical a priori will cease to be compelling. 
%XWSHUKDSV'DNZDU¶VDUJXPHQWDLPVWRcut deeper than this, to impugn the very 
validity of immanent critique as such? Such an argument would call into question the 
assumption that gaining critical distance on our historical a priori requires using historical 
methods, even if the ultimate aim of doing so is the overcoming or undoing of that notion and 
WKRVHPHWKRGV,¶PQRWVXUHLIWKLVLVZKDWKHLQWHQGVEXWLILWLVLWLVGLIILFXOWWRVHHKRZWKLV
DUJXPHQWFRXOGEHDGYDQFHGIURPD'HUULGHDQSHUVSHFWLYHJLYHQ'HUULGD¶VQRWLRQRI
inheritance, understood as taking up an intellectual tradition by radically transforming it from 
within. Insofar as both Foucault and Derrida position themselves as inheritors of the 
Enlightenment in this sense, as far as I can see this represents a significant convergence 
between their views.  
Unlike Saar, Treiber, and Dakwar, Noelle McAfee focuses on my response to the 
challenge of relativism, a challenge that emerges from my contextualism about normativity. 
She begins by juxtaposing my position with that of Richard Rorty, as articulated in her 1997 
LQWHUYLHZZLWKKLP0F$IHH5RUW\¶VSRVLWLRQDFFRUGLQJWR0F$IHHDPRXQWVWRD
problematic kind of relativism that critical theory would do well to avoid. As an aside, 
DOWKRXJK,FRQIHVVWKDW,¶PQRWNQRZOHGJHDEOHHQRXJKDERXW5RUW\¶VZRUNWRMXGJHKHU
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIKLP,ZRXOGDWOHDVWQRWHWKDW5RUW\¶VSULPDU\FRQFHUQLQWKHLQWHUYLHZ
seems to be with claims about objective truth or right or wrong, and his problem with such 
claims is that no one has sufficiently explained what they are supposed to mean. This at least 
suggests that his position would be better characterized as a radical contextualism as opposed 
to a simplistic relativism. Be that as it may, McAfee helpfully distinguishes my 
metanormative contextualism from the brand of relativism that she attributes to Rorty. 
Indeed, McAfee is quite right to point out that one of the core animating ideas of my own 
reconstructive proposal is that the opposite of foundationalism is not relativism but 
contextualism. 7KXV,WKLQNWKDW0F$IHHFDSWXUHVP\YLHZZHOOZKHQVKHUHIHUVWRLWDV³D
metanormative contextualism that is also beyond the absolutism-UHODWLYLVPGLFKRWRP\´ 
Thus, I agree with McAfee that, on my view, her imagined dialogue between a liberal 
and a fundamentalist would be one in which each has a lot to say to the other ± which is not 
to deny that this would be a difficult, perhaps even heated, and more than likely inconclusive 




do, however is to justify her normative perspective either by an appeal to its grounding in 
universal moral foundations or by a claim about its historical-developmental cognitive or 
moral superiority. This imaginary scenario helps to underline the fact that the main focus of 
my argument is not so much the content of specific normative views but rather the stance that 
we adopt in dialogue across normative disagreements. One of the core intuitions that my 
book attempts to work out is that there is a big difference (politically) between saying that 
you think that someone is wrong and saying that you think they are backward ± particularly 
when the claim of backwardness is entangled with ongoing histories of colonialism and 
imperialism. The latter is a way of denying or closing down what McAfee calls the conditions 
of pluralism and perspectivalism ± by asserting that a certain way of seeing the world is 
superior to others, and thus can serve as the standard by means of which other ways of seeing 
the world are adjudicated ± while the former is motivated precisely by the aim of preserving 
pluralism and thus holding open the condition for politics.  
Perhaps this KHOSVWRSURYLGHDQDQVZHUWRRQHRI0F$IHH¶VFORVLQJTXHVWLRQV
namely, can one read Habermas, Honneth, and Forst as engaged in a contextualist project, 
and if one were to do so, what if anything would I find problematic about their views? In 
answer to the second part of this question, I would repeat that the argument of the book is 
focused on the metanormative level ± that is, on the status claimed for various normative 
commitments and the strategies used to defend that status ± rather than on the first order 
normative level ± that is, on the specific understandings of discourse, or recognition, or 
justification advanced by these thinkers. Although I may well have other sorts of worries 
about the details of their normative projects, in the book these issuHVDUHQRWZKDW¶VSULPDULO\
at stake, which means that were these normative projects to be advanced in a more 
contextualist way, the position I lay out in the book would not cut as deeply against them. 
)URPWKLVPHWDQRUPDWLYHSHUVSHFWLYH+RQQHWK¶VSRVLWLRn is probably the one that is closest to 
mine, despite my deep disagreements with his understanding of progress as central to critical 
WKHRU\ZKLOH)RUVW¶VLVSUREDEO\IXUWKHVWDZD\VRPXFKVRWKDWLWLVGLIILFXOWIRUPHWR
imagine it in a contextualist IRUP7KHVWDWXVRI+DEHUPDV¶VZRUNLVPRUHFRPSOLFDWHG
insofar as it can be and has been articulated in a more pragmatist and contextualist way, 
though Habermas himself consistently resists such a reading.  
Finally, Andrew Feenberg presses an entirely different set of concerns, stemming 
from my attempt in the first chapter of the book to set aside the question of technological or 
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scientific progress in order to focus on progress in a normative sense. In a direct challenge to 
WKLVPRYH)HHQEHUJZULWHV³WKe very idea of normative progress rests on an analogy to 
scientific-technical progress. Only if the latter can be explained in the local, future oriented 
WHUPV$OOHQDSSURYHVFDQWKHIRUPHUEHHIIHFWLYHO\UHIRUPXODWHGRQWKRVHWHUPV´)HHQEHUJ
goes on to argue that modern societies are structured by rational systems such as technology, 
markets, and administrations ± what he calls the technosystem for short (see Feenberg 2017). 
Changes in the technosystem ± such as the adoption of body cameras as a means for curbing 
racialized police violence ± can be understood as instances of contextual, local progress in the 
VHQVHWKDW,LQYRNH0RUHYHU)HHQEHUJLQVLVWVWKDW³DQHIIHFWLYHFULWLTXHRI(XURFHQWULVP
must deal with the evident fact that the whole world has acFHSWHG(XURSH¶VVFLHQWLILF-
technical superiorLW\LQWKHODVWWZRFHQWXULHV´. This may be a contingent fact but it is, 
nonetheless, remarkable. But what if anything follows from it normatively? This is much less 
clear, as Feenberg himself admits. 
Feenberg contends that I implicitly accept that a consideration of scientific and 
technological issues is necessary to complete my argument about progress, an issue that 
HPHUJHVIRUKLPERWKLQP\GLVFXVVLRQRI+RQQHWK¶VDFFRXQWRIHWKLFDOOLIHDQGLQP\
analysis RI)RUVW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHVSDFHRIUHDVRQV)RU)HHQEHUJHWKLFDOOLIHDQGWKHVSDFH
of reasons are technically inflected, entangled with a set of technical and scientific practices 
that are embedded in the rational order of society. As a result, many contemporary 
progressive political struggles take place on the terrain of technical rationality ± a terrain that 
remains wholly unexplored in my account. 
There can be no doubt that Feenberg is correct that my discussion of progress 
deliberately and explicitly leaves aside discussion of scientific and technological issues. 
There is a kind of irony here, in that to a certain extent this move is justified by a bifurcation 
of scientific-technical and normative conceptions of validity that is itself a function of the 
Weberian-Habermasian conception of modernity that I aim to critique. While acknowledging 
this irony, I nevertheless thought it important to attempt to set aside such issues given my 
own lack of expertise in the history and philosophy of science and technology. Although I 
UHDOL]HWKDWVXFKDPRYHPD\EHXQVDWLVI\LQJWRVRPH,¶PQRWFRQYLQFHGWKDWLWLV
unjustifiable, particularly insofar as my aim in the book is not to produce a theory of progress 
RUDQRYHUDOODVVHVVPHQWRIPRGHUQLW\¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWR this concept. Rather, the aim was to 
expose the ways in which certain strategies for grounding the normativity of critical theory 
rely on a particular story about normative progress ± one that is articulated largely (though 
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perhaps not entirely) independently of claims about technical-scientific progress. In that 
sense, my focus is much more on the question of normativity than it is on the question of 
SURJUHVVSHUVH7KXV,¶PLQFOLQHGWRUHDG)HHQEHUJ¶VQRWDVDQDOWHUQDWLYHWRP\DSSURDFKWR
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